Doha and the Future of the Global Climate Regime

On May 9^th, 1992, the United Nations concluded the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, marking the first international treaty negotiating a solution to anthropocentric, or human-caused, climate change. Although the treaty lacked enforcement measures and explicit limits on greenhouse gas emissions, the UNFCCC managed to gather 154 signatory nations who agreed to meet in the future to negotiate the mitigation of climate change. Five years later, the UNFCCC met in Kyoto, Japan, where it set the first binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions and collected 83 signatures from both industrialized and non-industrialized nations. As of 2011, 191 countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, yet the United States remains the only nation that has declined to sign the protocol.

The Kyoto Protocol sought to reduce the participating industrialized nations’ greenhouse gas emissions by 5% between 2008 and 2012 against 1990 levels (Olivier). Despite the efforts of the protocol, greenhouse gas emissions have risen 5% since 2010. Meanwhile, nations have begun to question the United States’ commitment to, and the effectiveness of, international treaties on combating climate change (Olivier). On Monday, November 26^th, the UNFCCC will meet in Doha, Qatar to evaluate the success of previous treaties in meeting their 2012 emissions targets and set climate priorities for the next ten years. Thus, the Doha Protocol could be a critical juncture for President Obama to assert the United States’ participation in the global climate regime and for the international community to realistically evaluate its climate progress since the Kyoto Protocol.

The Doha Conference has a few broad goals for a protocol global effort to reduce climate change. First, if the major industrialized nations have failed to meet the emissions limits set by the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Protocol will extend similar emissions targets for 2018 or 2020 (Rönsberg). Although this goal acts upon the failures of previous treaties, economists and diplomats from signatory countries have signaled a renewed sense of urgency for the coming treaty, with some countries adopting a more pressing sense of urgency than others. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has disagreed with the larger, industrialized states over the timeframe for the next set of emissions targets. While the industrialized states advocate the 2020 date, which gives them time to adapt their economies to the emissions limits, the AOSIS prefers the 2018 deadline since those nations face the most immediate impact of unmitigated climate change.

 Furthermore, the upcoming protocol seeks to reinforce the agreement set at last year’s UNFCCC conference in Durban that limited a global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius. States at the Durban conference agreed that the two-degree threshold represented the proverbial “point of no return” for “dangerous” disruption of the climate (Rönsberg). While many industrialized nations already indicated their intent to limit emissions last year, over 100 signatory countries have yet to announce emissions goals for the coming year, including the Philippines, Thailand, and major oil producer, Saudi Arabia (Ibid). The Doha Protocol’s goal is then to synchronize global climate change goals and adjust various state goals to meet the two-degree limit

The states attending the Doha Conference have reasons to remain optimistic. In the past year, China, a major emissions-producing nation and sticking point in the UNFCCC’s 2009 Copenhagen Protocol, passed a domestic carbon-emissions trading program to limit carbon output (Lean). Climate experts also predict that incoming Chinese Communist Party head, Xi Jinping, will prioritize climate change on the legislative agenda. Moreover, despite its overwhelming share of the oil market and failure to articulate its recent climate policies, Saudi Arabia has decided to invest heavily in solar power to hedge against climate change and expand its presence the global energy market (Ibid). Both of these nations’ initiatives provide hope for an ambitious and effective Doha Protocol.

However, numerous obstacles could derail the protocol’s effectiveness. The role of the United States is a major question for the future of the global climate regime. Given the United States never ratified the Kyoto Protocol and remains the state with the largest volume of CO2 emissions, Doha represents the next opportunity for the United States to sign onto international climate protocols (Rönsberg). With Obama’s recent reelection, the president faces less pressure to sign onto the Doha Protocol. Obama’s endorsement of the protocol would represent a new direction in US climate policy towards an internationalized and institutionalized solution (Goldenberg). In his reelection speech, Obama recognized “the destructive power of a warming planet” (Goldenberg). If Obama fails to ratify the Doha Protocol, the United States risks getting shut out of future climate protocols.

Moreover, the Doha Protocol needs to settle the question of legal enforcement of the agreement before it can realize its climate goals. Unlike the previous Durban and Copenhagen agreements, the Doha Protocol will need to establish the same legal force seen in the Kyoto Protocol (Gray). Absent a mechanism to legally bind all signatories together towards a common climate strategy, states have no incentive to pursue the Doha strategy. As a result, signatories will either establish less-restrictive and domestic climate goals or will abandon the modification of their industries altogether. For example, European countries like the United Kingdom have conditionally committed to major industry cuts contingent on whether the United States will bind itself to the climate goals of the Doha Protocol (Gray). Beyond simply synthesizing the climate goals of the 191 expected countries, the Doha Protocol needs to ensure that these states will actually follow the goals established at the conference.

I believe the solution to the effectiveness of the Doha Protocol is threefold. Firstly, Obama must commit the United States as a signatory to the Doha Protocol while agreeing to its two-degree temperature increase limit and 5% reduction goals. Without US endorsement and commitment to the protocol, the protocol loses valuable US resources and diplomatic influence that fosters a successful global climate regime. The US signature on the Doha Protocol would broaden the scope of the global climate regime while providing legitimacy to international institutions in other fields beyond climate change.

Secondly, the signatories of the Doha Protocol need to agree on the 2018 target for emissions limitation instead of the 2020 deadline. The 2018 deadline would provide added pressure for industrialized states to modify their economies and would demonstrate the appropriate urgency to prevent the AOSIS states from losing their sovereignty at the hands of natural disasters.

Finally, the Doha Protocol needs to implement legally binding mechanisms similar to those seen in the Kyoto Protocol. As shown in the UK example, states only agree to climate protocols if their relative strength to other states remains unchanged. Without a legal mechanism for enforcement, states fear that uncooperative states will refuse the sacrifices required in the protocol at their expense. Although the process of ratification may become more difficult if states are forbidden to opt out of the agreement, this kind of legal force is necessary to ensure that the Doha Protocol avoids the mistakes seen in previous agreements. If the Doha Protocol combines legal power with ambitious climate goals, states will act in their collective interest to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Works Cited:

Goldenberg, Suzanne. “Obama Under Pressure to Show Doha He is Serious on Climate

Change.” The Guardian. 23 November 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/nov/23/barack-obama-doha-climate-change>

Gray, Louise. “UK to Sign Up to New Climate Treaty Rejected by US and China.” The Telegraph. 23 November 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/9699552/UK-to-sign-up-to-new-climate-change-treaty-in-Doha-rejected-by-US-and-China.html>

Lean, Geoffrey. “Doha: The World Holds its Breath Before Climate Summit.” The

Telegraph. 23 November 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/9699001/Doha-the-world-holds-its-breath-before-climate-change-summit.html>

Olivier, Jos, Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, and Julian Wilson. “Long-

term trend in global CO2 emissions: 2011 report.” Joint Research Centre – European Comission. 2011. <http://www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/C02%20Mondiaal_%20webdef_19sept.pdf>

Rönsberg, Andrea. “What’s at Stake at the Doha Climate Talks?” Deutsche Welle. 22

November 2012. <http://www.dw.de/what-is-at-stake-at-the-doha-climate-talks/a-16399354>