Can Liberalism Save Iran's Nuclear Program?

Can Liberalism Save Iran’s Nuclear Program?

By Sean Whalen

            In recent years, Iran has become painted as the greatest enemy of the United States with few reasons, mainly due to a barrage of misinformation claiming that Iran is just moments away from having nuclear weapons that it could use to destroy Israel, which already has over 300 nuclear weapons to its name (Amini, 2012). The actions of Iran have been somewhat secretive, though they have not directly broken any treaties they have signed that regulate nuclear energy; most of the controversy has come over the attainment of the uranium needed to fuel the reactors within Iran, and minimal investigation into the capabilities within the country to produce a nuclear weapon (Iran’s Nuclear Program).

Amidst much debate over the United States’ course of action in response to Iran’s growing nuclear program, former secretary of Iran’s National Security Council and head of Iran’s nuclear relations, Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, spoke at American University on October 4, 2012 to address the issue. In his speech, Ambassador Mousavian laid out 8 steps that should occur to bring US-Iran relations into a stable and peaceful condition. Those steps included: increasing mutual understanding of the other country and its actions, cooperation in confronting the problems at hand, prompting each country to take the higher moral ground instead of falling to the whims of investors and politicians, remove despoilers- countries benefiting from the conflict between the US and Iran- from the conversation, take Israel’s impact into account, remove the need for a perpetual enemy which Iran took over after the fall of the USSR, identify the real enemy as the extremist organizations that threaten everyone’s security, and finally direct the talks between the countries into the subject of the nuclear program in Iran (Mousavian, 2012).

This paper will closer analyze two of  Mousavian’s steps from a liberal perspective and attempt to show how such actions can lead to a more peaceful relation between the US and Iran. The two steps are increasing cooperation in resolving the issues and redirecting talks between the countries. In particular, these specific steps deal the most with an interaction with international institutions to ensure the eventual resolution of the negotiations.

Following the recent reelection of President Barack Obama, there has been increased talk of returning to negotiations with Iran, with the President stating that he is moving towards more comprehensive discussion on the issue with Iran. The Obama administration has attempted to approach negotiations in a new way, stating that they would ease the economic sanctions that have been placed on Iran, and when that did not prompt immediate action from Iran, the administration stated that they were searching for new ways to address the talks between the countries (Klapper, Lee). This is also a key time to return to the talks, as the election in the United States has ended, and Obama can now work without intense scrutiny by the GOP and the public, with more emphasis on resolving the issue instead of on winning the reelection (Williams). Even so soon after the election, there can be seen a marked increase in the willingness to negotiate through the situation by both sides, with concessions being discussed to resolve the issue. There is also a noticeable amount of responsiveness to the other state’s input that was not present in the preliminary negotiations before. Iran has also been open to cooperating with international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has done investigations into the actions of Iran’s nuclear program which focus of ensuring that their actions are not being done to attain a nuclear weapon (“International Atomic…”).

These developments in the relations between the United States and Iran and the talks that are occurring over Iran’s nuclear program can be related to the assurance of peace between by the work of Robert Keohane, particularly in his article “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” In this article, Keohane explains that harmony- a state where the actions of the actors involve are mutually beneficial- can be attained where it is not currently present through cooperation, particularly with an international institution, to achieve an adequate level of policy coordination (Keohane, 1988). One of the major roles that the institution plays is in providing an increased level of transparency through monitoring each country’s actions, which allows for interactions that are less steeped in uncertainty and a paranoid approach to maintaining security.

This analysis of an institution’s ability to facilitate cooperation and thus harmony can be applied directly to the case of US-Iran negotiations. Though Iran’s nuclear actions have been misleading and secretive, the presence of such organizations as the IAEA has produced a greater assurance that the actions of Iran are not entirely malicious. As such, the talks between the two states have been moving toward increased coordination, which, while advancing slowly, has allowed for a harmonious relationship to become a real possibility. In this way, the liberal emphasis on institutional cooperation can be seen working in this case as one of the main methods by which peace can be approached.

While the recent developments in the nuclear talks have been substantial, they have not been focused on the issue that should be addressed directly. As mentioned above, the Obama administration has stated that they would ease the economic sanctions on Iran in response to nuclear concessions, but a recent report by the UN has stated that those sanctions have had nearly no effect on the nuclear program of Iran, “They are for example producing enriched uranium up to five percent and 20 percent with a quite constant pace” (“Iran Nuclear Work…”). It is clear in this case that the discussion of easing the sanctions is being used as leverage to temporarily resolve the situation without making the fundamental changes necessary to ensure a sustained, harmonious relationship between the two countries.

Such distractions from the core issue of Iran’s efforts to create an internal nuclear energy program complicate the resolution of the conflict, and create a situation where cooperation with international institutions becomes a great deal more difficult. As Keohane writes, cooperation with international institutions occurs most often in cases where the cost of compliance is little and the benefits are large; if these conditions are not met, adherence to the institutions deteriorates and may disappear entirely (Keohane, 1988). As the focus of the talks strays from what is important, both states are forced to address issues that are much more costly for their individual security, for example, the United States’ reliance on its current nuclear arsenal, which has been the case as the US pulled out of nuclear arms talks in Finland, prompting outcry from Arab states and straining relations with Iran (Dahl).

 Unless the talks between the US and Iran redirect from where they are heading now, Iran’s connection to the international institutions that currently stabilize the relations between Iran and the rest of the world could become very fragile, and possibly reach the point where Iran no longer gains enough compared to what it loses by its participation and exit, destroying the current momentum towards harmony. Thus, the liberal framework of institutions must be kept in mind during the talks, as Iran could drop its agreement with organizations such as the IAEA, resulting in destabilized international relations.

These two points that Mousavian presents have the potential to facilitate peaceful negotiations between Iran and the United States, but only if they follow the standards of liberalism. The institutions that participate in the talks are crucial for ensuring their effectiveness and a lasting peace with Iran. However, if they are pushed to the extreme, or are subject to pressures that make their presence too intrusive, they can lead to a potential collapse of negotiations and a resurgence of conflict. Therefore, the work of Keohane can be used in this situation to create a discussion that benefits all parties involved, by allowing Iran to continue its nuclear energy program and the US to feel secure with the threat of another country gaining nuclear weapons.

Works Cited

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Dahl, Frederick. "Iran, Arabs Criticize Delay of Middle East Nuclear Talks." Chicago Tribune. N.p., 26 Nov. 2012. Web. 26 Nov. 2012. <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-nuclear-mideast-iranbre8ap0ky-20121126,0,2413415.story>.

"International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA Home." International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Nov. 2012. <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml>.

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/nuclear_program/index.html>.

"Iran Nuclear Work Unaffected by Sanctions: IAEA Chief." The Daily Star. N.p., 20 Nov. 2012. Web. 26 Nov. 2012. <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Nov-20/195671-iran-nuclear-work-unaffected-by-sanctions-iaea-chief.ashx>.

Keohane, Robert. "International Institutions: Two Appraches." International Studies Quarterly 32.4 (1988): 379-396. JSTOR Archives. Web. 19 Sept. 2012.

Klapper, Bradley, and Mathew Lee. "AP Sources: US Weighs Broader Nuke Deal With Iran." Huffington Post [New York City] 09 Nov. 2012: n. pag. Web.

Mousavian, Seyed Hossein. "Nuclear Relations Between Iran and the United States." American University. SIS Building, Washington D.C. 4 Oct. 2012. Speech.

Williams, Carol J. "Window of Opportunity May Open in U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff." Los Angeles Times 24 Nov. 2012: n. pag. Web. 26 Nov. 2012.