The DRC’s Ethnic Conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo has long been one of the world’s weakest and most problematic states. In 2011, The Fund for Peace ranked the DRC number two on its Failed States Index, deeming Somalia the only state in the world more likely to fail (Fund for Peace). Nothing illustrates the weakness of the Democratic Republic of the Congo better than an examination of its most recent conflicts, which have resulted in the death of over five million people since 1998 and have mainly been fueled by fighting involving two socially constructed ethnicities living in Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC (North).

In 1994, genocide took place in Rwanda in which members of the Hutu ethnic group killed over one million people, most of whom were from the Tutsi ethnic group. Once the genocide ended, Rwanda’s Hutu government was overthrown and a new Tutsi-led government took charge. This caused well over two million Hutus, many of whom committed atrocities during the genocide, to flee the country and make their way into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the East of which shares a border with Rwanda and reportedly has “porous borders” (Q&A…).

These rebels soon allied themselves with the then President of the DRC, Joseph Mobutu, and began terrorizing the Tutsis that lived in the Eastern part of the country. The governments of Uganda and Rwanda subsequently gave support to militia groups in the Eastern DRC to protect the Tutsis and attack the Hutus, and these groups eventually toppled Mobutu’s government and installed a new Tutsi-friendly regime under the leadership of Laurent Kabila to do the bidding of Rwanda and Uganda. However, Kabila proved unreliable and disinterested in ousting the Hutu militias, resulting in a new Rwandan and Ugandan force entering the country to remove him from power in 1998.

A prolonged war fought in the Congo ensued, and eventually Rwanda and Uganda were beaten back by the DRC and regional allies Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola in 2003 (Q&A). However, fighting began again in 2006 when a Tutsi rebel group backed by Rwanda called the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) began killing and causing unrest in the East until they were assimilated into the DRC’s army in a peace agreement signed on March 23, 2009 (Human Rights Watch).

However, the group’s leader, General Ntaganda, had two arrest warrants issued for him by the International Criminal Court for a litany of crimes. This turned the pressure up on the Congolese government to arrest him, who responded by gradually removing his power. In April of this year, he gathered up his followers and revolted, wreaking havoc in the Eastern provinces of the DRC under the name M23. Ntaganda deemed the DRC’s government to not have followed the terms of the March 23 treaty, thus taking the name M23 to spite them. Among other things, the M23 rebels, who are mainly of Tutsi ethnicity, have claimed that they must stay in the East to protect Tutsis there (Congo’s M23 Rebels…). Rwanda has given huge amounts of military support to these rebels in the form of lending Rwandan military troops, Rwandan child soldiers, weapons, ammunition, and training, which has been detailed in a UN report (Human Rights Watch). A report released by Human Rights Watch states that the M23 has used this support to massacre and brutalize civilians, tear families apart with forced child soldiering, and rape a staggering number of women.

Just a few weeks ago, the M23 took over Goma, a city of around one million and the capital of the eastern province North Kivu. The rebels have since voluntarily retreated from the city, but the conflict is far from over. The M23 has already made clear that its intention is to march on Kinshasa and overthrow President Joseph Kabila, installing what would presumably be a new regime friendly to Rwanda, Uganda, and Tutsis. Despite Rwanda’s and Uganda’s denials, the international community has widely accepted that Rwanda and Uganda support the M23 on a large scale and are much of the reason that it is able to continue its operations.

Constructivism does a wonderful job of explaining how a conflict such as this can arise. First, it is the view of Constructivists that “the international system is defined by socially constructed realities” (Lamy and Masker 93). The difference in ethnicities between the Tutsis and Hutus are indeed socially constructed, consisting of a difference so small that the two groups are nearly impossible to tell apart. In general, Tutsis are “taller and more slender, they have somewhat lighter skin, and thinner noses … the Belgian colonists classified someone as Tutsi if they had a long nose (or ten cows)” (Caselli and Coleman 36). In Rwanda, the difference between Hutus and Tutsis is so minimal that little more than the size of their noses can distinguish them. In fact, these ethnicities are so hard to tell apart that many Hutus were massacred during the 1994 genocide because they were taller or more slender than average.

According to Francesco Caselli and Wilbur Coleman, professors at the London School of Economics and Duke University, respectively, dividing a population along ethnic lines makes it much easier for the part of a population that gains power to treat another part of the population badly, taking away their rights and excluding them from any wealth the country possesses (2). This is exactly what happened in Rwanda during the colonial period, leading directly to the conflicts that have ravished the DRC since the end of the 1994 genocide. The difference between the Tutsis and Hutus was made by the Belgians purely to empower a small portion of Rwanda’s population and exclude much of the rest of it. This strategy proved to be quite effective, but also created a stratified society inside and outside of Rwanda that led to intense hatred between the two ethnic groups, despite the fact that they are separated by things as trivial as the size of their noses or number of cows in their possession.

These socially constructed identities are detrimental to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has had next to no peace since the end of the Rwandan genocide. The Tutsi-led Rwandan government is still out for revenge against the Hutus because the people who organized and committed the atrocities that wiped out much of the Tutsi population are still alive, living in the DRC. In fact, they have been terrorizing Tutsis since 2000 under the name the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR is a Hutu militant group in the East of the DRC that has been active in the DRC since its creation, working to limit the influence of Tutsis in the region by violent means. Rwanda has repeatedly justified sending troops into Rwanda under the pretense that they are fighting the FDLR, and it has accused the DRC’s government of supporting this militant group as well.

The Hutu-Ethnic conflict is one example of where ethnicities are much more important to a people than their nationality. Even though they are not Rwandan citizens, the Rwandan government has worked to protect Tutsis in the DRC for years despite the consequences, which among other things has included the cutting of aid.

One further aspect of this conflict that cannot be overlooked is the natural resources at stake in this conflict. Caselli and Coleman claim that when there is a greater amount of assets and resources that can be expropriated through conflict, the motivation to seek conflict is much greater (4). Indeed, the Eastern part of the DRC, especially the North and South Kivu provinces, is one of the most mineral rich areas in Africa, home to huge amounts of gold, tin, and coltan (Power Vacuum). These natural resources no doubt gave Rwanda an added incentive to attack the Eastern DRC, and Rwanda has made use of the natural resources they have found there. The M23 brought truckloads of looted materials from Goma, and stolen minerals have been pouring over the Rwandan border for longer than that. Rwanda has no doubt used this money to fund the operations of the M23, and dragging this conflict out will only increase the minerals that Rwanda is able to steal.

Coming to a resolution on this problem will not be easy. However, what is sure is that the fighting needs to stop. Rwanda and Uganda must have serious action taken against them with the threat of additional punishment should their support of the rebels continue. States around the world must condemn both of these governments as well and review whether or not they are deserving of foreign aid. Then, the UN should authorize the current UN troops in the country to use force to stop the M23 rebels as well as continue the support it is giving to the Congolese army. Once the fighting has stopped, a lasting peace must be worked out between the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda to stop the fighting that has plagued the East of the DRC. Although it will not be easy and it may take decades, Hutus and Tutsis must learn to live together and accept one another. Their differences are nothing more than a socially constructed identity, and it can be overcome. Education will be essential. Furthermore, the international community must monitor the peace once it is established; and ethnic violence in the region must quickly be put to a stop. The M23 and the FDLR need to be dismantled, otherwise the fighting between the Hutus and Tutsis may never end.

Caselli, Francesco, and Coleman, Wilbur John. “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict.” Duke.edu. September 2011. Web. 7 December 2012.
< http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~coleman/web/ethnic.pdf>

“Congo’s M23 Rebels Fighting for Tutsi Interests.” Chinapost. 24 November 2012. Web. 7 December 2012.
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< http://www.standnow.org/learn/aoe/drc/events>

 “DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes.” HumanRightsWatch. 11 September 2012. Web. 7 December 2012.
< http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/09/11/dr-congo-m23-rebels-committing-war-crimes>

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< http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive>

Lamy, Steven L., and Masker, John S. Introduction to World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

North, James. “Washington’s Role in the Renewed Violence in DR Congo.” TheNation. 21 November 2012. Web. 7 December 2012.
< http://www.thenation.com/article/171417/washingtons-role-renewed-violence-dr-congo#>

“Power Vacuum.” Economist. December 2012. Web. 7 December 2012.
< http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21567992-although-they-have-handed-back-city-rebels-have-not-faded-away-power-vacuum>

“Q&A: DR Congo Conflict.” BBC. 20 November 2012. Web. 7 December 2012.
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11108589>