Monday, October 22, 2012


The Global Blood Diamond Prohibition Regime
            For the past few decades, the sale of diamonds has been an invaluable asset to numerous anti-government rebel groups across Africa. These factions sell diamonds in exchange for money and weapons, facilitating wars and brutal acts of violence against civilians. The spilled blood resulting from the sale of these diamonds has led to the labeling of these stones as blood diamonds, and has subsequently become the focus of a global prohibition regime.
            Blood diamonds have been used to fuel conflicts since the civil war in Sierra Leone during the early 1990s. In this instance, leaders of the Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group trying to overthrow the government, gave diamonds to Liberian President Charles Taylor in exchange for weapons (Blood Diamond). As a result, the RUF carved a path of blood, tears, and semen through Sierra Leone, murdering and amputating innocent civilians, forcing children to become soldiers, and raping women. Throughout the 1990s, the use of diamonds to fuel similar conflicts was widespread in several African countries, including Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Blood Diamond).
            The global prohibition regime against blood diamonds fits nicely into the first four phases of the pattern established by Ethan Nadelmann that describes the evolution of most global prohibition regimes. The first stage of this pattern is when the activity is ubiquitous. At the start of the 1990s, the regime against blood diamonds was in the first stage, as countries all around the world engaged in the purchase of blood diamonds. However, it did not take long until this regime moved into its second stage, thanks to transnational civil society.
            During the second stage of Nadelmann’s pattern, “the activity is redefined as a problem and as an evil” (Nadelmann). In 1998, Global Witness became one of the first organizations to bring attention to the problem of blood diamonds by releasing a report detailing how diamonds had assisted a civil war in Angola. Eventually, “growing international pressure from Global Witness and other organizations played a crucial role in forcing governments and the diamond industry take action to eliminate conflict diamonds from the international trade” (Conflict Diamonds). Transnational civil society groups had set agendas, and the process of attempting to outlaw the sale of blood diamonds was well under way. By now, purchasing blood diamonds had certainly been defined as an illegitimate activity.
            According to Nadelmann, this acknowledgement of the evil of blood diamonds would be followed by the attempts of states to criminalize the activity. Indeed, it was not long after the release of Global Witness’s report on Angola that the United Nations Security Council had passed two resolutions banning the purchase of blood diamonds from Angola (Blood Diamonds). The success of global prohibition regimes often hinge on whether or not they receive support from powerful countries, and the fact that the global prohibition regime on blood diamonds began to collect support from some of the most powerful countries in the world, those of the UN Security Council, was significant.
            The UN did not stop with the passing of a few explicit Security Council resolutions, though, and the global blood diamond regime advanced to stage four.  This stage is significant because the activity in question is generally outlawed throughout the world and international institutions are established to coordinate the global response (Nadelmann). It did not take long until a formal international institution was established, once again through the help of transnational civil society. Meeting in Kimberley, South Africa in 2000, representatives from both the diamond industry and NGOs attempted to find a solution to the blood diamond issue (The Kimberley Process). The product, endorsed by the UN General Assembly and Security Council soon after, was The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KP).
            The KP seeks to stop the sale and purchase of blood diamonds by forcing all countries exporting diamonds to certify that their shipments were mined in conflict-free areas. Countries must “certify the origin of rough diamonds, and put in place effective controls to prevent conflict stones from entering the supply chain … and can only trade rough diamonds with other members” (The Kimberley Process). In the nearly ten years since its introduction at the start of 2003, the KP has been credited with stopping a respectable amount of blood diamonds from entering the market. Several countries have already been expelled and allowed to reenter once they have cleaned up their practices.
            Nadelmann’s stage five describes a condition in which the forbidden activity has been reduced to such an extent that it barely happens at all, and only on a small scale. In the case of the global blood diamond regime, it seems premature to claim that the sale of these stones has been reduced to this level. Regime leakage on a significant scale still exists in the world today, and the case can even be made that this regime has gone backwards in the past few years. Diamonds from countries not in the KP are constantly smuggled over the border and mixed into diamond shipments from countries that are in the KP. This has happened as recently as last year in the Ivory Coast (Violence). In addition, the KP has received a great deal of criticism by certifying governments like Zimbabwe who consistently infringe upon the human rights of miners, their most recent atrocity the killing of hundreds of mine workers in 2009 (Blood Diamonds). Furthermore, the KP has invited even more condemnation by continuing to certify diamonds from countries such as the Central African Republic whose profits are clearly funding rebel causes (Violence).
            The KP, as it is, is far from perfect. Recently, Global Witness, who was once an observer of the KP, left the organization in protest, claiming that it “has become an accomplice to diamond laundering – whereby dirty diamonds are mixed in with clean gems” (Global Witness). Many diamond selling states are too weak to stop blood diamonds from being mixed into their shipments. Furthermore, there are even some states that are willing to ignore blood diamonds for their own economic interests. Both of these severely undermine the KP, but the latter is exceedingly difficult to stop. If a few countries are not willing to halt a country’s diamonds from entering the market, as is currently the case in Zimbabwe, little can be done to improve the regime.
            If the global blood diamond regime is to perhaps one day enter the fifth stage, much reform will be needed. The Kimberley Process needs to improve its policing and broaden its goals. First and foremost, concerted efforts must be made to stop the smuggling of diamonds. If rebel groups in countries not part of the Kimberley Process are able to mix diamonds into the shipments of bordering countries that are part of the Kimberley Process, the entire process is undermined and rebel groups will continue their violent operations. Furthermore, the goal of the Kimberley Process must be broadened to stop diamonds coming from areas where miners suffer frequent violence as well as deplorable mine conditions. Diamond profits earned by governments like Zimbabwe provide money for conflict the same as profits earned by rebel groups and equivalently contribute to regime leakage. Better monitoring is also needed so it is clear when states are breaking the rules.  It seems overly optimistic, however, to expect anything to change until the structure of the Kimberley Process is modified. The process by which member states make decisions must be changed so that one state cannot block the will of the rest and the process can work as designed.



Works Cited
“Blood Diamond.” Wikipedia. 2012. 21 October 2012.

“Blood Diamonds: Still Bloody.” WorldPress. 14 May 2010. 21 October 2012.
<http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/3543.cfm#down>

Nadelmann, Ethan. “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution of norms in international society.” International Organization 44. World Peace Foundation, 1990. 21 October 2012.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-183%28199023%2944%3A4%3C479%3AGPRTEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q>

“Conflict Diamonds.” Global Witness. 2012. 21 October 2012
<http://www.globalwitness.org/conflict-diamonds>

“Global Witness leaves Kimberley Process, calls for diamond trade to be held accountable.” Global Witness. 5 December 2011. 21 October 2012.
<http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-diamond-trade-be-held-accountable>

“The Kimberley Process.” Global Witness. 2012. 21 October 2012.
<http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process>

“Violence” Brilliant Earth. 2012. 21 October 2012.
<http://www.brilliantearth.com/confict-diamond-trade/>

12 comments:

  1. Thanks for the post Jeremy! The issue with the trade of blood diamonds is an interesting and important problem that needs to be handled more effectively by the KP. I would like to follow up with some readings about how and when the KP will reform itself to improve its function as a police-keeping institution.
    My question to you is, what would a realist believe are the reasons for states to get involved in the global prohibition institution of preventing blood diamond trading? We briefly discussed this point in class without any solid conclusion, and I find this question puzzling, so I’m interested to know what you think about this.
    Thanks again!

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    1. Hey Emilie thanks so much for your comment, that’s a really great question!
      I think Realists would say that becoming involved in the global blood diamond prohibition regime is important for two reasons. First, diamond exporting countries would want to become involved in the Kimberley Process so that consumers abroad are reassured that the diamonds that they buy really are symbols of love and devotion and the money that they are spending isn't funding death and destruction. Otherwise, widespread stories of blood diamonds could begin affecting the global demand for diamonds in general. Thus, it is in their national interest to give the allusion that their industry is completely legitimate. Two, countries in the Kimberley Process can only buy and sell diamonds to other countries in the Kimberley Process. If diamond importers and exporters want to be legitimate members in the diamond industry at all, it is necessary to be a member of the Kimberley Process. Once again, it is in a country’s national interest to be involved in order to maximize their trade and give the greatest benefit to their economy. I hope this helps!

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  2. Thank you for this article! I only briefly have heard of blood diamonds and now the whole concept makes a lot more sense! I would like to ask a sort of abstract question. Which of the 5 steps that Nadelmann outlined, in your opinion, is the hardest to bring about on a global scale? I realize that most people would answer the 5th because it is extremely difficult to get almost all of the citizens' support and cooperation on prohibiting something, so if you could, please focus on the first 4. Thanks again!

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    2. Hi Valerie, that’s an interesting question thanks for commenting! Among the first four stages, I believe that the fourth stage would probably be the hardest to attain on a global scale. I in no way wish to imply that the preceding three stages are simple to accomplish, but the fourth stage presents several challenging problems. In order to really enter the fourth stage, the laws put in place by the regime need to be successful. The solutions may not function as well in practice as they were intended. Furthermore, the new regime has to contend with states that aren't willing to stop the activity from taking place, as well as states that are too weak to actually stop the activity from taking place. Solutions to these problems can be extremely tricky. Indeed, the blood diamond prohibition regime is still having trouble with all of these issues.

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  3. Your post does a very good job of explaining the different sides of this issue, and I think it is useful to see the 5 steps we talked about in class applied to a real life situation from start to finish, so thank you!

    My question is kind of specific, but at one point you mention that, "Several countries have already been expelled [from the KP] and allowed to reenter once they have cleaned up their practices." Has this method been effective at all at "cleaning up" diamond laundering practices? I would think that kicking countries out would be almost counter productive to the cause. How strong is the incentive for these nations to be in the KP?

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    1. Hey Madison, thanks for the comment! I didn't talk much about this in the blog, but expelling members has actually been somewhat successful at cleaning up those countries' practices. At the same time, the system has also failed a bit. Zimbabwe was recently allowed the reenter the KP despite having egregious human rights violations at their mines. However, overall, the incentive to be in the KP is great because states in the KP can only buy and sell diamonds from other states that are in the KP. Pretty much all of the countries in the world that are in the diamond industry are a member of the KP, so when a diamond exporter gets expelled they are almost completely cut off from selling diamonds to other countries. Thus the incentive to fix up their practices and reenter the KP is great for these countries, otherwise they have no way of selling their diamonds.

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  5. Definitely an interesting topic for a blog post. I have a question regarding the Kimberly Processes strategy to halt the spread of blood diamonds. It appears as if the primary strategy for the KP is boycott diamonds mined to stem the global demand for diamonds (a goal which the KP itself is, apparently, culpable of undermining), but what should the members of the Kimberly Process be doing in terms of encouraging more ethical treatment of miners or pressuring these governments to reform mining practices within their countries?

    Moreover, you alluded to monitoring efforts on the part of the Kimberly Process. How would these members monitor issues such as diamond smuggling between KP and non-KP states which circumvents KP authority?

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    1. Hey Patrick thanks a lot for commenting, those are two great questions! What the Kimberly Process should be doing to improve mining practices is sending more people to monitor the situation at mines to make sure that miners aren't being abused. If human rights violations are reported, then members of the Kimberley Process need to act quickly to suspend or expel those members. Once this is done, the suspended or expelled country should only be allowed to reenter once mining practices have been reformed and miners are no longer being mistreated. As for your second question regarding the smuggling of diamonds from non-KP states into KP states, this is probably the trickiest and most difficult problem that the KP faces. Nothing is currently being done to stop this smuggling, and it doesn't appear like anything will be done in the near future. Although the KP does require governments to certify that their diamonds aren’t from areas of conflict, they don’t require governments to certify the mine of origin for these diamonds. Therefore, you end up with countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo who (it is estimated) don’t know where 40% of its diamonds come from. A significant amount of these is no doubt from areas of conflict. Requiring countries to certify where exactly they get their diamonds from would be a step in the right direction. Beyond this, it would take a great deal of money and effort from KP countries to improve monitoring, something that it does not appear anybody currently has the stomach for.

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  6. This is a very interesting blog post, and really sparked some thoughts. Why do you think Global Witness believed that their act of leaving the Kimberley Process, in an act of protest, would increase the legitimacy of the prohibition? It seems counter-intuitive to leave an organization rather than work to make it better.

    Also, and perhaps this is a much repeated question, do you think realism, liberalism, or constructivism would best explain the beginning of the blood diamond legacy? Or would you say that it would be best explained using parts of each theory?

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  7. Hey Annie thanks for commenting, you have two really interesting questions there. I don't think that Global Witness believes that leaving the Kimberley Process increases the legitimacy of the prohibition. They believe that the regime has gone so far downhill that it is now an accomplice in the trading of blood diamonds. Furthermore, they believe that the countries within the Kimberley Process have no desire to reform it. Therefore, I believe they have left to draw attention to the significant shortcomings of the KP and underline their belief that it is a broken system with no hope of reform. Maybe they believe that they can be more effective at stopping blood diamonds from outside of the Kimberley Process, starting anew, than from within. As for your second question, I believe that realism BEST explains the start of the blood diamond legacy. States like Liberia were interested in obtaining natural resources for their own benefit to make money, and thus began trading money and weapons to rebel groups for blood diamonds.

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