The Dilemma of
Expanding the United Nations Security Council
The United Nations (UN) was
established in 1945, following the end of the worst war in human history. The
original charter was signed by 51 nations and provided for a General Assembly
of all the member states and a Security Council consisted of fifteen seats. Ten
of these seats would rotate between the member states, elected for two year
periods. The other permanent five (P5) seats would belong to the United Kingdom
(UK), France, the USSR (now Russia), the United States (US), and The People’s
Republic of China (PRC), and they would all have the power to veto any motion
before the UNSC, thereby stopping it from passing. This status quo remains to
the present. Today, with a quickly developing world with many more militarily
and/or economically ‘risen’ nations, the question of whether other countries
should be given permanent member status has been brought before the UN. In
fact, had the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) expanded at the same rate
as the General Assembly, there would currently be 57 UNSC members, 19 of them
permanent. That means that Germany, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil,
South Africa, Nigeria, Canada, Australia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Italy, and
Spain would, or could, all be permanent members of the UNSC. In effect, it
would mean that, today, every tenth member of the United Nations would have the
power to veto anything proposed to the UNSC. Besides being a logistical and
bureaucratic nightmare, such a situation could lead to the creation of voting
blocks, resulting in a multi-polar UNSC with several states in each block.
Worst of all, all of these nations would have to be convinced not to veto in
order to pass anything through the UNSC. So one theoretical solution which I
thought would be interesting to consider would be creating a third type of
member to the UNSC with permanent member status, sans the the veto power.
From a rationalist perspective,
none of the P5 countries would weaken their vote by giving any new permanent
member the right to veto it. While a P5 veto would still be as definite as
before, the security of their vote, however, would be diminished (from 1/5 of
the needed votes to pass to 1/6). Perhaps, if even one seat were added to the
UNSC then a resolution could pass that could create a similar 2/3 majority
mandate between the USNC P6 (theoretical), just like there exists in the
General Assembly in order to pass. Such a change would only go to further
undermine the power promised the P5 in the creation of the UN Charter. From a
reflectionist point of view, granting more states permanent member status
might, in theory, create a greater sense of inclusion. For instance, adding
India would permanently, albeit ceremoniously, represent nearly another seventh
of the world’s population at the UNSC. However, adding one people and not
another could create great ethnic or international tension. How would Pakistan
be appeased after the addition of India?
14 nations could, in theory, be
given a permanent seat on the UNSC, but that would mean expanding the current
table by at least 4 seats (and that would be without any rotating memberships
at all). The UN was set up, post WWII, as an institution meant to decrease
ethnic tensions and lower the chances of the breakout of wars between member
states. The solution for doing so was by giving long-term, permanent veto
powers to those nations that had proved they could withstand the extremes of a
World War and were stable enough to succeed in the future. Granted, the USSR dissolved
in 1991, but only Russia was allowed to stay as a P5, and for good reason. The
other, smaller states were not as capable of protecting themselves and their
nuclear arsenals. The truth remains, the P5 control almost all of the nuclear
weapons in the world. Even post WWII, these nations had the strongest
conventional militaries in the world, and remain to this day, both
technologically and offensively, the most capable military powers.
So, if adding vetos to the UNSC
would diminish the power and prestige of the current P5 members, what could be
done to at least expand the dialogue? By giving states permanent seats but not
giving them veto powers, the P5 would essentially be giving a greater voice
(but no bite) to several key players on the international stage. Yes, walking
along the middle road makes one look ahead enviously, but it may so greatly
legitimize the global ambitions of so many of the world’s peoples that the UNSC
could once again be seen not as a club of zero-sum capable players but as a
group of the most responsible members sharing the greatest risk in the case of
the breakout of a major war. Put in an even more reflectionist perspective, it
could perhaps create an atmosphere in which UN Peacekeeping and Peacemaking
missions could once again be undertaken because of greater, permanent
participation. I’m not saying that it would be perfect, and I am definitely
leaving on the table the idea that non-veto able states could block together
and demand certain concessions from the P5 for cooperation, but that is all
part of the greater realm of International Relations (IR). It is also important
to note that nations given such seats would definitely then vie for even
greater inclusion and the eventual power to veto. That I would attest as a result
of progress and the momentum of a changing world like ours.
In a world where the P5 have
agreed that IR is no longer a zero-sum game, it is completely acceptable to ask
why then is it that the nations which are the most secure and have the largest
nuclear arsenals would have made that decision? Perhaps it is because they are
altruistic, after all the UN is a liberal institution. It would be an amazing
thing if a nation like Germany or Japan were added to the ranks of the P5. Not
only would a larger portion of the world’s GDP be added in representation at
the UNSC, but it is important to remember that neither of these nations ever
had nuclear weapons programs, and both have had extensive civilian nuclear
capabilities. Perhaps adding such nations, with or without the power to veto,
would show the world that those nations capable of sustained stability will be
rewarded with a greater say in the UN by the UNSC and at least a 2/3 majority
of the General Assembly. Whether or not the UNSC is expanded, by either adding
more veto-empowered states, just permanent members, or more rotating seats, it
is very important to remember both the symbolic and direct power of the UN.
Such an organization is meant to give legitimacy to stable, free, and accepted
regimes. Perhaps, it could be in the best interest of the P5 to add more
permanent members. Not only would it go to further legitimize the far-reaching
actions and powers of the UNSC but also give the P5 nations the image of
‘development builders’ and ‘inclusive states’, not ‘power-mongers’.
“Barack Obama in an address to a Joint Session of the
Parliament of India", Lok Sabha, India, 9 November 2010
"Charter of the United Nations: Introductory Note
." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. The United
Nations, n.d. Web. 24 Sept. 2012. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice. PDF. P. 4,8,11
Craig, Dylan. "The UN, Rationalism, Reflectionism."
SIS-105-038H World Politics. American University. Watkins, Washington, D.C.. 24
Sept. 2012. Class lecture.
"India." U.S. Department of State. U.S.
Department of State, n.d. Web. 24 Sept. 2012.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm>.
Lamy, Steven L.. Introduction to global politics.
Brief ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Print. P. 144
"Statement by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the
Russian Federation at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly", New
York, Unites States of American, 23 September 2009
I thought this point was interesting in class and I'm glad you've expanded it; this was a compelling read.
ReplyDeleteI'm interested in your opinion on how some of the hypotheticals you've drawn up would play out if put to the test of real life. You give many good reasons as to why new nations should be included as non-veto members, but you also include possibilities of failure in this proposed system (as in the example of states "then [vying] for even greater inclusion and the eventual power to veto"). How could a rationalist weigh the costs and benefits of having non-veto states? Would a reflectivist be able to justify it better?
I'd also like to know what states you could argue would be the "best" (rationally or reflectively) to fill these non-veto seats?
I'm glad you liked it, and I really like your questions.
ReplyDeleteFirstly, I think that rationalists from the P5 would not agree to expanding the Security Council because it threatens the power of their vote and the 'selectivity/uniqueness' of the UNSC. If they did, I think they would push for the candidates either not being permanent or having non-veto status. So, with these non-veto states the clearly greatest cost is expanding the dialogue to possibly critical or dissenting nations. Now,I'd argue that their dissent may not carry any weight because they cannot strike something down - but a minimum amount of votes between all the members (9 right now) do have to be cast 'yes' for a resolution to pass. The P5 do not carry the power to push something through without minimal support from the other 10 members, or how ever many we theoretically add. Evidently, that's a cost, but it's a possible benefit if those added nations were to side with the P5. If these added states then bandwagoned with a (theoretically) united P5 on a cause then they could prove the deciding votes on a resolution. Another possible benefit is that the Security Council could not just offer greater prestige to nations but could also demand from its permanent members greater participation in Peace missions or funding support for the UN. Here, to justify such a move, the P5 may also have to increase their commitments, but adding enough or strong enough permanent members that could balance the cost/benefit sheet would outweigh the costs.
I do think that reflectivists have an easier time justifying an expansion to the UNSC. If you were to read the statements made before the UNGA by Presidents Obama or Medvedev, their messages to possible candidates focused on inclusion in UNSC. A reflectivist, I think, would argue that the focal point of adding permanent (veto or non-veto members) would be to create a greater sense of inclusion, not just in the UNSC, but in the UN at large. Political correctness aside, reflectivists could argue that such additions are inevitable and should happen sooner rather than later because of the abruptness with which they may happen later - when it is inevitable and there is a sense of 'okay, we've had enough, we're coming in whether you like it or not', which are the sort of tensions that usually tend to fester in situations of inequality. However, could a reflectivist then justify adding non-veto over veto members? I frankly think that, if they are trying to play the game long term, they'll realize that change is more controllable and less detrimental when taken steps at a time, and I would argue that the first step would be adding non-veto members.
To address your last question (and I'm sorry this reply is so long, can you tell I had trouble keeping the paper under 1,500 words, for my sanity and yours), rationalists who want votes would probably add states already aligned with the P5 - that's a loaded answer because the P5 don't necessarily get along. France could push for EU partners (Spain, Germany), Great Britain for Commonwealth members (Canada, Australia), the US for NATO or other allies (Turkey, South Korea, Japan), Russia for former Republics or CIS members still loyal to it (and that number is shrinking almost by the day), and China could, in theory, push for nations that it wants in its zone of influence, but I would argue that because of China's recent explosion in relevance in the world it actually wouldn't want to threaten or curb its own growth of power by giving any power to anybody else.
(I can't add so many words at once, really I am really thorough)
ReplyDeleteFrom the reflectivist stand point, I think that an inclusion-driven decision would add nations with large, growing populations, economies and capabilities. These nations include, but aren't limited to, Brazil, India, Indonesia. There are no Arab/majority-Islamic states on the UNSC, perhaps Saudi Arabia or Turkey could fill that void. Other possibilities, as I mentioned include powerhouses like Germany or Japan, or a technologically-prowess-ed nation like Korea. If we're thinking of adding African and/or Latin American states we have to consider Nigeria (population), South Africa (democracy), Brazil (again), or Mexico (population and growing economy). One could argue that because Uruguay gives the most military personnel to the Peacekeeping missions, it should unquestionably have a seat on the SECURITY Council. The only problem with an inclusion-based UNSC is that the UNGA is already supposed to be all-inclusive. So, where would they stop? Adding Germany could anger the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and other EU member states. Adding Japan would undoubtedly make China unhappy, and possibly South Korea and the Philippines. If India enters, then Indonesia, Bangladesh and Pakistan would throw fits of rage. And then there are those nations that simply wouldn't like being part of an even smaller non-decision making club - nations like Croatia, Vietnam, Jordan, Liberia, Argentina, Denmark, Ukraine, North Korea, Iran, and Afghanistan that would almost certainly never be considered for candidacy because their either too far-leaning from one of the P5 or too close to one of the nations that is being considered for a non-veto seat.
But there you have it (sorry for the length, I like being thorough). For those nations I consider 'best' you can look at the article, I listed them (not in preferential order though, now that I think of it). My three though: India, Brazil, Germany/Japan (these two are very close to already-existing P5 members so I don't know if both could be added). Note, those four are the G4, coincidence? At least one in my opinion HAS to be a never-nuclear power. In the end, well the end is far away (I hope) so the UNSC and the UNGA will almost undoubtedly change somehow by then.
The current state of the Security Council is a topic that I know I had to participate in many debates about in high school. I never heard a suggestion like this come up. I wonder though, why states would want this position. Symbolically, yes they appear more powerful on the world stage by being permanent members, but their actual powers have not changed. Whether a member is permanent or not, their votes essentially mean nothing without veto power. I understand the concept that by getting smaller promising states more involved, they become more developed. But is there any other motivation to become this "third kind" of security council member?
ReplyDeleteYou're definitely right, these states don't have much more power without being able to veto. Of course a permanent seat on the UNSC does always give you a vote on several key issues, the ones that are proposed to the UNSC from the UNGA. I would say that being this 'third kind' of member would probably be the first step to get veto powers. States who were given such a position would then unquestionably be the first ones up for candidacy for veto powers - and being first in a line can mean the difference between being listened to and being forgotten about in the UN. I don't know if becoming part of the UNSC would 'develop' India or Brazil or any other nation so much as being proof of their development. But I do agree with you completely, a permanent non-veto seat is not one with all that much power, but it is a compromise that could lead to significant reform.
ReplyDeleteI've always been a bit amused when it comes to the IR tendency to talk about states as if they were entities who behaved and thought along the same lines as people. It is interesting that the ideas of operant conditioning are often applied to states, and still more intriguing that, oftentimes, the conditioning appears to work. For example, you mention that "those nations capable of sustained stability will be rewarded with a greater say in the UN by the UNSC," alluding to the principle of positive reinforcement, or offering a desired outcome or situation--here, having a louder voice in world politics--in order to repeat desired behavior--or, sustained stability with reduced conflicts, more developed infrastructure and government, and so on and so forth.
ReplyDeleteMy musings over IR and behavioral psychology aside, I did find it interesting that you pointed out the P5's ties to Nuclear development. That was a connection that I, I'm ashamed to say, never made. Your proposal to add states without nuclear weapons, should the UNSC expand, is therefore well thought out. I do have one question: what do you make of the suggestion that the UNSC be broken down into regional committees? Would that reduce any or all efficiency or legitimacy of the current state of the UNSC, or is it a viable option?
Annie, I too have a love-hate relationship of thinking about states as people and try to more often talk about governments interacting with governments (something I don't always seem to be able to do). As for your question, I think that getting rid of the P5 and having regional subcommittees in today's world would be absolutely counterproductive. In an age where terrorism is grown in Asia and Africa and strikes in Europe and North America... well regional committees would only go to slow things down. And from a realist perspective they could create a multipolar situation in which each region has a 'strongman' and several smaller 'supporters'. But, to bring up nuclear weapons again, there are rockets today which can fly over entire regions of the planet and hit the other side of the earth. Nuclear weapons are still the top priority of the US government when it comes to defense (US Defense Strategic Outline, 2012). Abolishing the entity which creates a direct, unhampered dialogue between ALL the major nuclear wielding powers would be risky to say the least. As regions go - that's also a problem. Europe? Eastern Western? North America (well that's the US, Canada and Mexico... paired with the Bahamas and Cuba as opposed to a Western Europe with three dozen states)? Africa? North? South? I'm arguing that there are so many differences within so many 'regions' that I think a unilateral dialogue can bring nations from different sides of the globe together at the same time and make nations next to each other at least speak to one another. That unilateral dialogue is something like the UNGA and the USNC (just a bit more inclusive... which it seems we both agree is growing into a bit of a problem).
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